Every series' subscribed Upside is pooled into a single lot and sold in a descending-clock, uniform-price auction for the quote stablecoin (mUSDG on testnet).

Thirty-second steps, per-subscriber reserves, one price for every fill.

Why a descending clock

Upside is hard to price (unknown volatility), comes from scattered supply (many subscribers' lots), and must be priced inside a narrow window (two hours after open). A descending clock lets the market discover the clearing price itself: the price falls until cumulative demand first covers supply, and every fill executes at that single clearing price. Subscribers get a uniform, transparent premium; bidders have no last-second sniping game.

Parameters

| Parameter | Value | | --- | --- | | Start price | 50% of P0 | | Floor price | 2% of P0 | | Step length | 30 seconds | | Steps | 240 (total 2 hours) | | Half-life | 20 minutes — price halves every 20 min | | Minimum bid | 0.001 units | | Protocol fee | 5% of gross |

The price curve

The clock is a pure function of time — anyone can recompute it on-chain, nobody can manipulate it:

t    = step × 30s
base = startPrice halved (t ÷ 20 min) times
p    = base − (base / 2) × (t mod 20 min) ÷ (20 min)
price(step) = max(p, floorPrice)

With P0 = $224.41 the clock reads $112.21 at step 0, $56.10 at minute 20, $28.05 at minute 40, … and pins at the $4.49 floor around step 207.

Taking part

Bidders — bid any quantity while the clock runs. Your bid escrows ceil(units × currentPrice) in mUSDG. Bids stack; once the price falls past an old bid's step, that bid simply stops being competitive. After clearing: filled amount is charged at the clearing price, the rest of the escrow refunds in full.

Subscribers — your lot carries the reserve step you chose when subscribing. Lots whose reserve step is stricter than the clearing step do not sell; that Upside returns to you claimable, still mergeable, still settle-able.

Anyone — once the crossing step ends (or the two hours elapse), anyone calls finalize. A failed round (zero volume) can be rescheduled into a new slot, keeping lots and reserves.

Clearing and allocation

Supply at step s is the total size of lots whose reserve step is at s or later; demand is the cumulative bid quantity. The crossing step is the first step where supply falls below demand — its clock price clears the auction.

Inside the crossing step, if demand oversubscribes the remaining supply, allocation splits between priority addresses (capped at half the remainder) and the public; same-step bids fill in arrival order.

sold  = filled demand
gross = sold × clearing price
fee   = 5% of gross → protocol fee vault
net   = 95% → subscribers, pro-rata on sold quantity